Ss received series of electric shocks to the forearm in which the temporal schedule and the sequence of shock intensities were associated with varying levels of randomness or uncertainty. The Ss were permitted an instrumental response which produced, in advance, information concerning 1 or both of these aspects of the shocks. Such information functioned as a strong positive reinforcement for most Ss. Instrumental response rate was a significant increasing function of the degree of uncertainty associated with the shock series, and occurred significantly more often for information concerning the temporal occurrence of shock than for its intensity.
Studies of information deprivation have
shown that the reduction of uncertainty regarding series of photic stimuli reinforces instrumental response and that the rate of response is an increasing linear function of the magnitude of the uncertainty reduced (Jones, 1961 (Jones, , 1964 (Jones, , 1966 Jones, Wilkinson, & Braden, 1961) . In these experiments the reduction of uncertainty through the presentation of series of brief light flashes varying in their statistical properties appears to constitute a reinforcement principle that is independent of any observable, direct association with a previously established primary or secondary reinforcement. This suggests that the reduction of uncertainty may be a dimension of reinforcement of considerable generalityserving to modify a wide range of human behaviors.
The purpose of the present study was to assess the human motivational processes associated with the reduction of uncertainty concerning future pain. The subjects experienced various conditions with the instruction that some brief, painful electric shocks to study was supported in part by Grant MH 07632 from the National Institute of Mental Health, United State Public Health Service. Experiment II is based upon a master's thesis submitted by the third author to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Pittsburgh. the forearm would occur, but that the schedule of shocks and their intensity would be probabilistically determined, so that the subject would always be in some measure uncertain as to the characteristics of the stimulation he would receive. The subject was permitted an instrumental response which would provide information (uncertaintyreduction) concerning future shocks in the form of messages transmitted via earphones. In the first of two experiments, it was hypothesized (a) that the majority of subjects would perform such responses, (b) that response rate would be an increasing function of the degree of uncertainty associated with the temporal sequence of the shocks, and (c) that response rate would be greater when associated with the reduction of uncertainty concerning two stimulus dimensions rather than one. The expectation that the majority of subjects would perform the uncertaintyreducing responses was based upon the view that the reduction of uncertainty permits the subjects to make responses which serve to minimize pain and/or anxiety. Such responses may be of a "central" or ideational type, such as thinking to oneself "I don't have to be anxious about the shock now because it is not due for 1-J minutes," or of a motor type, such as waiting relaxed till the shock 87 is due and then gritting the teeth or making other postural adjustments which provide kinesthetic feedback serving to "compete" with painful stimulation. Messages which reduce uncertainty would then be expected to function as strong positive secondary reinforcements because of their role in mediating the reduction of pain and/or anxiety. The principle of secondary reinforcement may be applied in a more direct fashion to the present problem, however, to yield an opposing hypothesis. As the uncertainty-reducing messages are always followed by shock, the messages must be presumed to acquire some negative secondary reinforcement value, thus leading to a tendency not to respond. Some animal experimentation indicates that a warning signal may even become more aversive than the shock with which it is associated (Sidman & Boren, 1957) . In the present experiment the potential positive and negative secondary reinforcement factors are not mutually exclusive, and the experimental design permits an assessment of their relative strength.
EXPERIMENT I Method
Subjects. Thirty-two male undergraduates served as paid volunteer subjects. They understood prior to volunteering that electric shocks were involved and that they would be permitted individually to designate an upper limit of shock intensity which would be observed throughout the experiment.
Apparatus. Shocks of 1.5-second duration were administered through silver electrodes to the subject's nonpreferred forearm. Shock intensity was controlled by a Variac. The subject sat before a panel containing a well-illuminated clock dial placed at eye level. The experimenter sat in an adjacent room before a second clock synchronized with the first. The subject held in his preferred hand a button with which he could signal a request for information to the experimenter, and wore earphones through which the messages were received.
Experimental design. Subjects were randomly assigned to two experimental groups. Group 1 (N = 18) was permitted to respond for information (uncertainty-reduction) concerning the temporal occurrence of the shocks. Group 2 (N = 14) was permitted to respond for information concerning both the temporal occurrence and the intensity of the shocks. Each subject received 12 shocks in each of three consecutive 12-minute conditions separated by 3-minute rest periods. The three conditions corresponded to low, medium, and high degrees of temporal uncertainty of the shocks. The subjects understood that the shocks could occur only at the quadrants of the clock dial, that is, as the second hand crossed 3, 6, 9, or 12. Under low uncertainty, the 12 shocks were scheduled randomly within the 12-minute period but with the constraint of a 45-second minimum interval between shocks. Under medium uncertainty, the 12 shocks were randomly scheduled with a minimum between-shock interval of 30 seconds; and under high uncertainty the between-shock constraint was reduced to IS seconds (technically no constraint at all, as the time scale employed in each of the conditions had IS seconds as its "unit" value). The three conditions were administered to the subjects in counterbalanced order.
The intensity of the shocks was in each condition varied randomly over five levels which were denned with reference to each subject's preliminary scaling of shock tolerance. The subject's minimumperceptible and maximum-tolerable shocks were determined in Variac units. Intensity Level 2 was set at the mid-point of that range and Level 5 at the top (i.e., maximum-tolerable), with Levels 3 and 4 representing equal Variac intervals between them. Level 1 was determined by subtracting one equal Variac interval from the mid-point of the range. The shock levels determined in this fashion appeared, collectively, to be substantially aversive for each subject, yet readily discriminable. In each of the three conditions, the sequence of shock levels was randomized with the constraint that no more than two shocks of the same level may occur consecutively.
Procedure. The subjects were run individually. In printed instructions, the subject read an explanation of the preliminary shock scaling and of the first of the three conditions. The instructions emphasized that the subject was free to respond as often or as seldom as he wished, that the shocks were scheduled automatically by the apparatus and totally unrelated to subject's responses, and that the experiment was not concerned in any way with possible personality implications of the subject's pattern of responses. The subjects understood that response for information was permitted for only one shock in advance; that is, subjects were not free to accumulate information about two or more shocks by rapidly repeated button presses.
The shock scaling was carried out by administering an ascending series of shocks in small increments, starting from zero. Following determination of the subject's minimum-perceptible and maximumtolerable shocks, the five levels were computed. The subject was informed of the principle of randomization over the five levels and was given a sample shock of each. During the experiment the shocks were administered manually by the experimenter. In order, however, to avoid the socialpsychological implications of punishment personally administered, the subject was told that the shocks were determined automatically by the apparatus in accordance with predetermined schedules. The experimenter then explained the use of the clock. The subject was to note the position of the second hand whenever he would press his button to indicate a request for information. The experimenter would then announce over the earphones the time remaining before shock onset. This message was always given in 15-second units (e.g., "45 seconds," "1 minute, IS seconds"). The subject was instructed to begin the count of that interval from the quadrant of the dial immediately preceding the position of the second hand at the time of the button press. For example, if the subject pressed his button when the second hand was at some point between 3 and 6, and if the message was "45 seconds," he would know that the next shock would occur when the second hand next passed 12. The subject was rehearsed briefly to ascertain his ability to interpret the messages correctly. The procedure described thus far applied to the subjects of Group 1. Group 2 was treated identically except that each button press was followed by a message indicating the level of the shock as well as occurrence (e.g., "1 minute 30 seconds-level five").
Prior to beginning the first condition, the minimum interval between shocks was explained to the subject, but without reference to the constraints applying to the remaining conditions. The constraints for the second and third conditions were explained to the subject over the earphones immediately prior to their beginning. From the beginning of the first condition to the end of the third, the experimenter remained out of sight in an adjacent room. At the conclusion of the experiment a brief questionnaire was administered which was concerned with the aversiveness of the procedure, the subject's rationale for his pattern of response or lack of it, and other points intended as informal guidance for the experimenters.
Results
Eight of the 32 subjects made no responses, five in Group 1 and three in Group 2. The number of responses made by the remaining 24 subjects ranged from 2 to 36, with an overall mean of 16.75. (The mean response rates of Groups 1 and 2, including data from nonresponders, were 11.06 and 14.50 respectively, and do not differ significantly; t < 1.0.)
In Figure 1 , proportional response rate is plotted as a function of the degree of uncertainty associated with the three conditions. The data consisted of each subject's response rate for each condition expressed as a proportion of their total. Thus for each subject three proportions summing to one were computed. The proportional transformation was employed in order to remove variance associated with individual differences in absolute response rate, which are irrelevant for an assessment of this function. The analysis of variance of trends (Grant, 1956) shows response rate, pooled over the two groups, to be a significant linear function of degree of information (F(l,23) = 8.76, p < .01). Considered separately, the functions for Group 1 and Group 2 are each significant-F lin.
(1,12) = 4.88, p < .05, and overall F (1,10) = 4.38, p < .05, respectively. The differences between the functions are not significant (F < 1.0).
Discussion
The results support the view that the reduction of uncertainty concerning future pain constitutes a positive reinforcement for the majority of the subjects. Their answers to the postexperimental questionnaire suggested that the motivation to respond rose sharply when an unusual interval had passed without shock, that is, when in a state of high temporal uncertainty, and whenever a shock of high intensity was anticipated.
The hypothesis that response rate would be an increasing function of the degree of temporal uncertainty was supported by analysis of the data for Group 1 and for Groups 1 and 2 pooled (see Figure 1) . The analysis for Group 2 showed significant differences in response rate between the uncertainty levels but failed to show either the linear or quadratic components as significant (.05 < p < .10 for both). As the observed downward inflection at high uncertainty for Group 2 is not reliable, it would appear that the pooled function, which is significantly linear at p < .01, may be regarded as the best estimate of the true relationship of response rate to level of temporal uncertainty. The increasing trend of responses over uncertainty values is consistent with the theory that higher degrees of uncertainty are associated with parallel increments in anxiety, and that it is anxiety which motivates the uncertainty-reducing responses.
Support for the third hypothesis, that response rate would be greater when associated with the reduction of uncertainty concerning two stimulus dimensions rather than one, was not obtained. Subjects receiving information about the schedule and intensity of shocks did not respond significantly more often than those receiving information only about the schedule. This would seem to suggest that uncertainty-reduction concerning the temporal occurrence of shock is of greater motivational relevance than uncertainty-reduction concerning shock intensity, possibly because of its greater role in the control of anxiety. In this context, certain deficiencies of the experimental design become apparent insofar as a test of the hypothesis relating response rate to number of dimensions of uncertaintyreduction is concerned. If it should be true that temporal uncertainty is of greater motivational relevance, then an experiment in which Groups 1 and 2 respond for intensity information and for intensity-plustemporal information, respectively, would be expected to have results opposite to those of the present experiment. That is, the use of temporal information as the additional dimension of information in Group 2 should result in a greatly and significantly increased response rate. Thus the present experimental design could not be regarded as adequate in this regard unless the assumption is made that the different dimensions of uncertainty are of equal motivational relevance. A further limitation of the design is suggested by the great individual differences in absolute response rate. As the comparison in question is based upon the data of independent subject groups, and as the obtained difference was in the hypothesized direction, the problem of Type 2 errors is raised. The magnitude of the individual differences in absolute response rate suggests that a repeated-measures design would have been more appropriate for a test of the hypothesis.
EXPERIMENT II
The purpose of the second experiment was to provide (a) a more adequate test of the hypothesis that response rate will be greater for two dimensions of uncertainty-reduction than for one, (b) a further assessment of the shape of the function relating response rate to the degree of uncertainty within stimulus dimensions, and (c) a comparison of the motivational relevance of uncertainty-reduction regarding the intensity of shocks and their temporal sequence. A further intent of the experiment was the development of a technique which would elicit a higher level of motivation for uncertainty-reduction than that occurring in Experiment I. The general approach was to increase the absolute uncertainty values of the stimulus dimensions and to sensitize subjects to them by the instructional set.
Method
Subjects. Twenty-four male undergraduates served as paid volunteer subjects. As in Experiment I, subjects understood in advance that electric shock was involved and that they would be permitted to designate the upper limit of shock intensity. Each subject was required to meet a shock-intensity criterion and a response-rate criterion in order to be retained in the study. The intensity criterion was the establishment of an upper limit at least 35 Variac dial units above the minimum-perceptible intensity, in order to assure that seven shock levels would be clearly discriminable. In order to increase the reliability of the proportional response rates which were employed heavily in the analysis of data, a minimum of 10 responses over the total experiment was required.
Apparatus. The subject sat before an illuminated clock dial below which two response buttons were mounted on a wooden panel-one labeled "time," the other "intensity." A continuous record of response was kept by an Esterline-Angus recorder. Shock duration was 2.0 seconds. The apparatus was in all other respects similar to that used in Experiment I.
Experimental design. A repeated measures design was employed in which all subjects received three conditions corresponding to low, medium, and high uncertainty, within each of which response for temporal information, intensity information, or both was permitted. The level of uncertainty characterizing a particular condition was the same for the temporal and intensity dimensions.
The levels of uncertainty were operationally de-fined by the degree to which the intensity and the intershock interval pertaining to each shock varied randomly from those associated with the immediately preceding shock. There was a maximum of seven "variation units" for both the temporal and intensity dimensions. For the intensity dimension the seven units corresponded to seven equally spaced Variac values ranging from Level 1, which was set at five Variac dial units above the minimum-perceptible shock intensity, to Level 7, which was the subject's upper limit of intensity. The units of the temporal dimension consisted of the seven intershock intervals ranging from IS seconds (Level 1) to 1 minute 45 seconds (Level 7) in IS-second increments. Under the low uncertainty condition, the interval and intensity of each shock were varied randomly among the three values closest to the interval and intensity associated with the preceding shock. Thus if a particular shock was at Level 4 intensity and had occurred after a Level 5 interval (1 minute 15 seconds), the intensity of the next shock would be randomly drawn from Levels 3, 4, and 5, and the intershock interval would be randomly drawn from Levels 4, S, and 6 (1 minute; 1 minute IS seconds; and 1 minute 30 seconds).
Under medium uncertainty, the intensity and interval of a particular shock were randomly selected from among the five levels closest to the values associated with the preceding shock. Under high uncertainty the intervals and intensities were drawn randomly from the total range of seven levels.
The duration of each condition was 14 minutes, within which 14 shocks were administered-two at each of the seven intensity levels. The initial shock in each condition was randomly selected from the seven levels.
Procedure. Instructions similar to those of Experiment I were given to the subjects orally. They were informed that the "time" and "intensity" buttons could be pressed singly, in either order, or simultaneously. The only restrictions on response were that none should be made while receiving a shock, and that use of a particular button should not be repeated until an intervening shock had occurred. It was again emphasized that subjects were to feel free to respond as often or as seldom as they wished. At the beginning of each condition, a 3 X 5 inch card indicating the set of intershock intervals in effect and the rule governing the determination of shock intensities was placed under the clock dial before which the subject sat. The procedure was in all other ways the same as that employed in Experiment I.
Results
The absolute response rate was substantially higher than in Experiment I. Only three subjects were excluded for failure to meet the criterion of 10 responses. The total number of trials was 42. For the 24 subjects meeting the criterion, the number of trials on which one or both buttons were pressed ranged from 10 to 42 with a mean of 34.75.
The hypothesis that response rate would be greater for two dimensions of uncertaintyreduction than for one was assessed by comparing the proportion of the trials on which both buttons were pressed with the proportion on which only one button was pressed. The difference was in the expected direction but was not significant (£(23) = 1.61, p> .OS).
In Figure 2A proportional response rate is plotted as a function of degree of uncertainty. The analysis of variance of trends shows the overall function to be significant (F = 3.44, df -2/46, p < .05), but with neither the linear nor quadratic trends attaining significance (F -3.17 and 3.50, respectively, with df = 1/23 and p > .05). In the interest of gaining further information concerning the probable shape of the "true" function relating response rate to degree of information, a similar analysis was carried out upon the absolute response rate data ( Figure 2B ). This analysis of the function showed the linear component, but not the quadratic, to be significant-/? lin. (1/23) =4.91, p < .05, and F quad. (1/23) = 1.36, p > .05.
Speed of response was also analyzed as a function of degree of uncertainty, with individual subjects' speed scores computed as the mean of the reciprocal latencies of the responses. Data for a particular subject were excluded whenever there was an absence of response at any of the three degree-of-uncer- tainty conditions, in order that absence of response would not be confounded with zero latency; thus the Ns for these analyses are less than 24. The nature of the speed function was found to be related to the number of responses made per trial. Considering the trials in which responses for both temporal and intensity information were made ("both" trials hereafter), response speed was shown to be a significant linear function of degree of uncertainty-(see Figure 3 ) F lin.(l,16) = 13.60, p < .01, and F quad. (1,16) = l.SO, p > .05. Considering the trials in which only one response was made ("single" trials hereafter), neither the overall trend nor either component was significant-overall F and F lin. < 1.0, F quad. (1/16) = 1.20, p> .05. The speed functions for the "both" trials and for the "single" trials differ significantly as tested by the linear component of the interaction (F (1/9) = 9.40, p < .02). The mean absolute speed scores, however, pooled over uncertainty conditions, were significantly higher (faster) for the "single" trials than for the "both" trials (F (1/9) = 11.64, p < .01).
The motivational relevance of the temporal and intensity dimensions of uncertainty-reduction was assessed by a comparison of absolute response rates for the two dimensions. Response rate for temporal information was significantly greater than for intensity information (* = 2.19, df = 23, p < .05).
The means were 29.0 and 22.8, respectively. Considering "single" trials only, the effect was magnified, the two means being 5.7 and 12.7. The absolute speed scores, however, were significantly higher for responses for intensity information than for temporal information (t = 2.16, df -21, p < .05).
Speed functions over degrees of uncertainty were analyzed separately for responses for temporal and intensity information. For intensity information, response speed was an increasing linear function of degree of uncertainty (F lin. (1/19) = 10.13, p < .01). For temporal information, response speed was not significantly related to degree of uncertainty -overall F (2/42) = 3.05, F lin. (1/21) = 3.85, F quad. (1/21) = 1.88, each with p > .05.
Discussion
The results of Experiment II provide strong additional support for the view that the reduction of uncertainty concerning future pain functions as a positive secondary reinforcement for the majority of subjects. Eighty-eight percent of the subjects met the criterion of 10 responses. The average percentage of total trials on which one or both of the possible responses occurred was approximately 83%. Thus the positive reinforcement potential associated with the uncertainty-reducing messages appears to have substantially outweighed the negative secondary reinforcement potential which must be assumed to have developed to some degree because the messages were regularly followed by shock. The exact mechanism or mechanisms involved in the reinforcement were not considered directly in this study. Questionnaire data and informal discussion with subjects, however, appear to support the formulation that uncertainty concerning future pain elicits anxiety and that the uncertaintyreducing responses mediate the reduction of anxiety through subsequent ideational and postural-muscular responses. It appears further that the ideational responses, for example those by which the subject reassures himself that he will not be shocked until a particular period has elapsed, are somewhat more prominent in the control of anxiety than the postural-muscular responses which may reduce pain magnitude by providing "competing" sensory input.
If the reduction of uncertainty is positively reinforcing, then the rate of instrumental response should be an increasing function of the amount or degree of uncertainty which is reduced. The analysis of variance of trends applied to proportional response rates showed significant differences associated with degree of uncertainty, but with neither the linear nor quadratic components attaining significance (Figure 2A) . A parallel analysis of the absolute response rates ( Figure 2B ) showed a significant increasing linear function. Proportional treatment of response rate is ordinarily preferable for such repeated measures designs in which individual differences in absolute response rate are irrelevant, but the alternative analysis is useful in view of the ambiguity associated with the first. The combined results of Experiments I and II suggest that the function relating response rate to degree of uncertainty is monotonic and negatively accelerating.
Experiment II provided a second and independent measure of response strength-speed. Considering the trials in which responses for both temporal and intensity information occurred, proportional response speed was shown to be a significant increasing linear function of degree of uncertainty (Figure 3) , thereby broadening the support for the formulation that uncertainty-reduction regarding pain constitutes a positive reinforcement. For trials in which a single response was made, however, no significant trends over degree of uncertainty were found. A possible explanation for this discrepancy is suggested by the finding that the absolute speed scores were significantly higher for the "single" trials than for the "both" trials. It appears likely that the relatively prompt response on "single" trials may have substantially attenuated anxiety, and that the "both" trials, in which response was slower, may have been associated with substantially higher levels of anxiety. The failure of discrimination of uncertainty levels as measured by response speed on "single" trials may reflect simply a much lower level of anxious arousal.
The hypothesis that response rate would be significantly greater for two dimensions of information than for one was not supported in Experiment I. In the present experiment, a more sensitive test of this hypothesis was provided by means of a repeated-measures comparison of the number of trials on which both responses were made and the number on which a single response was made. The difference was again nonsignificant. Comparison of the proportional response rates for temporal and intensity information, however, provides an interpretation of this negative result. Response rate for temporal information was significantly greater than for intensity information, and there was but a very slight and nonsignificant difference in the number of trials for which both responses were made and the number for which only temporal responses were made. Thus it appears that temporal information was very much more motivationally relevant than intensity information, and that the additional intensity information occurring on the "both" trials constituted but a minor increment in reinforcement. This interpretation is consistent also with the findings of Experiment I, in which subjects allowed to respond for temporal or for temporal plus intensity information showed a but slightly and nonsignificantly higher response rate for the latter. Due to the differential motivational relevance of the two dimensions employed in the present study, the hypothesis that response rate is a function of the number of dimensions of uncertainty-reduction remains essentially untested and awaits further experimentation in which the motivational equivalence of the dimensions employed is established in preliminary scaling.
Evaluation of the relative reinforcement values of temporal and intensity information is complicated by the finding that, while the frequency measure of response strength shows temporal information to be superordinate, the speed of response measure was significantly greater for intensity information and was significantly related to degree of uncertainty for intensity information only. A clear explanation of this seeming paradox does not appear to be provided by the present data.
